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--IN THE SUPREME COURT OF. THE
STATE OF UTAH

STI.TE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
17513

-vsLEONARD LIPSKY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NJl.TURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was originally charged with violation
of§ 76-5-103(b) of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
The information alleged that on or about the 16th day of
October, 1978, he committed an assravated assault upon the
?erson of one Laurie Bacastow by attempting, with unlawful
force or violence,

to to bodily injury to Miss Bacastow by

such means of force likely to produce death or serious bodily
i~J~r:·

~o

Miss

Bacasto~.

DISPOSITION

I~~

THE LO\vER COURT

The appellant was arraigned on November 3, 1978,
and pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.

However,

at the time set for trial, on Novenber 14, 1978, he changed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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his plea to guilty as charged, which plea was accepted by
the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, presiding in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, in and for Utah County,
State of Utah.

Following a series of events which eventual!

led to this appeal, appellant was sentenced to one to five
years in the State Penitentiary on August 29, 1980, by the
Honorable David Sam, Judge, Fourth Judicial District Court
in and for Utah County.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmation of the sentence
imposed by the Court below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Following the acceptance of appellant's plea of
guilty on November 14, 1978, by Judge Sorensen, time for
pronouncement of the judgment was set for December 8, 1978,
and the matter was referred to Adult Probation and Parole
Department for pre-sentence investigation, pursuant to Ut~
Code Ann.§ 76-3-404

(1953,

as amended).

On November 30, 1978, appellant requested the Cou::
to order the disclosure of the pre-sentence report.

At the

time set for sentencing, December 8, 197 8, the Court cienied
appellant's request for disclosure of the report.

The

appellant at that time was committed to the Department of
corrections for a ninety (90) day evaluation, pursuant to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Utah Code Ann.

§

76-3-404

(1953, as amended).

On March 8, 1979, the appellant appeared for
se~tencing

t

D~strict

before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock in the

Court for the Fourth Judicial District in and

for Utah County.

At that time the 90-day diagnostic

evaluation had been disclosed to the appellant, but access
to the pre-sentence report had been prohibited.

Appellant

was then sentenced to be incarcerated in the Utah State
Prison for a term not to exceed five years, and to make
restitution to the victim in the sum of $100.00.
Appellant was then extradited to the State of
New York where he was tried for second degree murder of a
person he had allegedly confessed to killing, which statements
were taken while appellant was in custody in the State of
Utah.

The New York Court dismissed the jury's guilty verdict

on :;arch 24, 1980, and entered a verdict of acquittal.
Appellant was thereafter returned to the Utah State Penitentiary.
On appeal in this case the Utah Supreme Court
'".

ruled,

in State v. Lipsky, 608 P. 2d 1241 (Utah 1980) , that

the appellant's sentence be set aside and that he be resentenced after the State had disclosed to him the contents
of the pre-sentence report.

After receiving a copy of said

report and undergoing supplemental psychological analysis,
aopellant was resentenced to one to five years in the State
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Penitentiary on August 29, 1980, in the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Utah County, the Honorable David
Same, Judge, presiding.

That sentence is the subject of

this appeal.

ARGUMENT
Before addressing appellant's points of argument,
respondent feels that it is necessary to the disposition of

this appeal to discuss briefly, in more detail, the colloquy
which transpired on the day appellant was re-sentenced,
August 29, 1980.

At that time appellant's counsel expressec

concern that reference to the murder charge in New York,

of which appellant was acquitted, was made in the pre-senten
report

(Transcript of Sentencing, pp.3-5).

The reference

was made in the pre-sentence report in the form of a
statement by Ms. Betty Davies of the Provo office of the
Adult Probation and Parole Department to the effect that
appellant had admitted during an interview at the Utah Stati
Hospital to having committed a homicide in the State of
York.

lib·.

Appellant further named the victim and the location

of the homicide during his interview with Ms. Davies (Transc
of Sentencing, p.3).

Because of the subsequent acquittal,

appellant's counsel felt that any mention of that proceeuir,
including· appellant's reference and admission to the killl
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ourin9 his interview with the Adult Pr.obation and Parole
Department, should be stricken from the pre-sentence report
(Transcript of Sentencing, pp.3-7).

The county

attorney's

response to appellant's motion was that the first intelligence
gained on the subject of the murder charge in New York came
from appellant's own mouth as he was interviewed by a member
of the Adult Probation and Parole Department.

As such,

reference made by the appellant himself to the murder charge
is relevant information and ought to be considered by the
court.

However, the county attorney stated that anything

concerning the legal or trial aspects of the case in New
York ought not to be considered by the court and that he
felt that the court was entirely capable of sifting the
irrelevant from the relevant (Transcript of Sentencing, p.7).
In denying appellant's motion for a new pre-sentence
report o!ilffiiting ap?ellant's statements referring to the New
~·or:<.

!1urder case, Judge Sam stated:

. . . It does appear to me counsel that any
matter civen bv the defendant to the Adult
Probation anc Parole Department is a matter
that is to be appropriately considered by the
sentencing court and that matter having been
oiven it coes appear to me that it is a matter
that is in the record.
I understand Mr. Lipsky
[appella..~t] that the matter, as counsel has
accuratelv stated, has gone onto New York, that
the New Y~rk court has acquitted you, that you
have in fact been found not guilty by the New
York court and all of those matters are in my
documen~ation and have been considered by me.

i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Now I believe counsel that the matters
have been given appropriate consideration
. I understand that pursuant to the
record that I have that he [appellant]
made a statement to Betty Davies I believe
as you have stated.
That statement is in
the file.
It has been considered by the
Court and I understand what has happened
with that pursuant to the legal requirements
of the law and those matters are before me
and have been considered by me.
Now I believe that they are appropriate
matters for consideration for what thev are
worth and I have considered that the S~preme
Court or the Appellate Court of New York has
found Mr. Lipsky not guilty.
Now these
matters are all in the file and I have them
before me and I am giving what weight to
those matters that I feel should be given
weight to and the matter before me is the
matter of the offense here in the State of
Utah.
(Transcript of Sentencing,pp.7-8).
The court further stated in addressing the appellant:
Mr. Lipsky, I have given consideration to
your file.
I understand that you have made
remarkable progress.
That you have great
support from your family.
You have support
from many individuals who have come foward
and have made statements in your behalf and
I have considered all of those matters and I
have given what weight I feel should be given
to them .
(Transcript of Sentencing, p. 9).
Prior to announcing the sentence, the trial coort
gave a detailed explanation of the reasoning used to detern:
appellant's sentence:
Alright Mr. Lipsky let me advise you of the
matter that is of most concern to the court.
I certainly compliment you for the progress that
apparently you have made.
It appears from the
file that I have that you have made good progress

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and ther~ are people who apparently have
a sreat deal of faith in you and I feel
that you have been if I might term it such
a 'model prisoner' which I wish to commend
you.
It appears however to the court that
the thing that is of most importance in all
of these reports and I am not just discounting
those letters of recommendation from your
family, your loved ones, and people who are
not maybe in that category who have had contact
with you in the prison here or in New York
and it appears that you have done a remarkable
job, but the one item that is of most concern
is the update of the psychological report
which is I believe the thing that the court
here has been interested in and interested in
receiving and in getting that update. Now we
do have an update in the file, dated July 28,
1980, received July 30, 1980, and it is part
of the report and it is this report that I
feel that I have to give considerable weight
to and emphasis to.
This report is signed
by Richard T. Grow and in essence this is
what he states in his concluding paragraph:
'In short we have test data which suggest that
Leonard is temporarily improved, but not cured.
Further, there are clear indications that
Leonard periodically tends to lose proper
intellectual control over his behavior.
On
such occasions he will display behavior whlch
is impulsive, egocentered, oppositional and
devoid of proper judgment.'
Now !·Ir. Lipsky the thing that of course I am
concerned about is the interest that we have here
and I am sure vou understand those.
You have your
interest and "-~ want vou to become rehabilitated
and I want you to con~inue to proceed and progress
as vou have and I am pleased from what I read, but
the-other interests that I must weigh as a sentencing
judge in this matter is the interest of the public
in this particular matter. This was a crime, a crime
of violence which could have resulted in verv verv
serious consecuences and fortunately it did not go to
the extent th~t maybe possibly it could have gone,
but nevertheless the elements were there you see and
so I must weigh those interests and the thing.that.I
am concerned about is the update that I have in this
particular report. Now-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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MR. LIPSKY:
Your Honor, if I may?
THE COURT:
Yes you may.
MR. LIPSKY:
Your Honor, I feel that I have
gained quite a bit of progress from being in
the prison situation.
I have come to a number
of realizations about myself.
On the other ha~
I feel that I have spent as much time growinc "•
in that particular situation as I possibly c;n
and perhaps any further delay, any more
time that I will be doing at the state prison
could possibly be detrimental and most probably
will not be helpful.
THE COURT:
I understand Mr. Lipsky and that
is the risk that I feel that I have to take in
this matter and as I said to you Mr. Lipsky I
don't relish having to be the sentencing judge,
but on the other hand I must not shirt my
responsibility and I must weigh these matters as
I feel they should be weighed.
Now in all due
concern to these matters and there being no
legal reason why judgment should not be
pronounced at this time and having given
consideration to the reports as I have seen ther: I
and what weight I feel I should give them and what
relevancy I feel should be given to them, it is
going to be my judgment that you be confined in
the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term
. I am going to ask or recommend to the pa:o1'
board that they consider your conduct in this ma::'
your time that you have served, and that these
considerations be given to you in any parole
consideration so that if Mr. Lipsky can be given
consideration relative to the time he may be
considered for parole, that I would be happy as
the sentencing judge to make this observation to
them by way of letter if you would deem that
appropriate.
Transcript of Sentencing, pp. 11-13.

POINT I
THERE HAS BEEN NO SHO\HNG THJ.l.T THE INFORMATION
RELIED UPON BY THE LOl<'ER COURT IN SENTENCING
APPELLANT WAS NOT ACCURATE AND RELIABLE·
Respondent submits and fully agrees 1·:i th appella,,:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that one convicted of a crime has a right to be sentenced
on the basis of information that is accurate.
Lipsl-:y,

608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980).

State v.

Furthermore, any

information which may be misleading should not be used by
a judge without the defendant's knowledge and without

?roviding him with an opportunity to refute or explain
such information.

State v. Harris, 585 P.2d 450 (Utah

197 8) .
Appellant has impliedly alleged in Point I of his
argument that the information used as a basis for his
sentencing was inaccurate and unreliable.

He made no

specific allegations to substantiate his argument, but
merely states the law as set forth in the recent case of
State v. Lipsky, supra, as well as federal law.

No specific

allegations of inaccuracy or unreliability having been set
~c:-th

by appellant in Point I, respondent submits that any

i~plied

allegations of inaccuracy intended by appellant

:-ec;-crding information upon which his sentence 1-;as based
~c~

be considered by this Court.

-9-
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POINT II
RESENTENCING OF APPELLANT BY THE
TRIAL COURT WAS PROPER AND BASED
l1PON INFORMATION WHICH WAS PROPER
FOR CONSIDERATION
Appellant alleges that his statements to the
Adult Probation and Parole Officer regarding the murder
case in New York and any other reference to that charge
should not have been considered by the trial court in
sentencing.

His reasoning is that the court has no basis

for determining whether or not the allegations regarding
appellant's statements are accurate.

His argument also

seemingly implies that since appellant was acquitted of
the murder charge, any and all reference to that charge is
inappropriate in the sentencing process, i.e., the incident
should be treated as if it never occurred.
Though this Court has never specifically stated
that crimes with which an accused has been tried and
acquitted are not the subject of proper consideration in
the sentencing process, case and statutory law of this
State and other jurisdiction either impliedly (as is the
case in Utah) or specifically approves (as is the case in
lltah's sister states and federal courts) of the use of
such information.
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-3-404

(1953, as amended),

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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states in relevant part:
(1) In felony cases where the court
is of the opinion that imprisonment may
be appropriate but desires more detailed
information as a basis for determining
the sentence to be imposed than has been
provided by the pre-sentence report, the
court may, in its discretion, commit a
convicted defendant to the custody of the
division of corrections for a period not
to exceed ninety days.
The division of
corrections shall conduct a complete
study of the defendant during that time,
inquiring into such matters as the
defendant's previous delinquency or
criminal experience, his social background,
his capabilities, his mental, emotional
and physical health, and the rehabilitative
resources or programs which may be available
to suit his needs .
. the court, prosecutor,
and the defendant or his attorney shall be
provided with a written report of YeSUits
of the study .
(Emphasis added.)
The legislature, in the wording of the statute,
does not expressly limit the scope of the diagnostic study
tc a defendant's criminal convictions, but specifically uses
the phraseology "defendant's previous deliquency or criminal
experience."

?. crir:iinal experience can range from arrest

and subsequent release to arrest and subsequent trial
proceedings resulting in conviction or acquittal.
,.

In State

Siebert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957), this Court,

in discussing the discretionary powers in the granting or

denying o~ probation following conviction, stated:
. . . The granting or withholding of
probation involves considering intangibles

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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...

of character, personality and attitude,
of which the cold research aives little
inkling.
These matters, which are to
be considered in connection with the prior
record of the accused,
. must of
necessity rest within the discretion of
the judge
. 310 P.2d at 393 (Emphasis
added.)
Thus a criminal experience most definitely includes a
defendant's prior record.

No limitation as to arrests

which result in subsequent acquittals is placed upon the
terms "criminal experience" or "prior record" either by
statute or case law in this State.
It would seem that the legislature, in its enact·
ment of § 76-3-404, intented for a sentencing judge to ~w
as much reliable information as possible to make a sound
determination which will both protect the general public's
interests and at the same time help to rehabilitate the
defendant.

Many sources of information are required from

which to acquire all the needed information to accomplish
such a task.
864

As stated in State v. Carson, 597 P. 2d 862,

(Utah 1979)
it
sentencing
sentencing
sources of

should be noted that the
judge's discretion in
may be based on several
information .

Some of Utah's neighboring states have specific~'.
ruled that the use of a defendant's record which includes

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

arrests resulting in acquittals is permissible during the
sentencing process.
1J.'.2d 998

(1979).

State v. Stanley, 123 Ariz. 95, 597

In State v. Kelly, 122 Ariz. 495, 595

1J.2d 1040 (1979), the Arizona Court of Appeals said:
In making sentencing decisions, a trial
court which is vested with discretion as
to the limits of the sentence may consider
all information possible about the defendant's
past conduct.
[cites omitted).
In performing
this function, the trial judge is not
necessarily restricted to considering only
evidence admissible at trial.
[cites omitted).
This broad discretion to consider all relevant
information extends even so far as to allow
consideration of evidence of crimes for which
the defendant has been charged, tried and
acquitted [cites omitted).
595 P.2d at 1043,
1044 (emphasis added).

-13-
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1

The courts in the State of Washington have held
like the Arizona courts.

State v.

Hernandez, 20

225, 581 P.2d 157

(1978); State v. lVilcox,

617, 581 P.2d 596

(1978); State v.

624,

(1975),

537 P.2d 760

Wash.A~.

20 \'lash.App.

Dainard, 85 Wash.2d

stand for the proposition that

an arrest without trial or conviction is a proper matter
for consideration by the court at sentencing, wherein
Hernandez and Wilcox follow the factual situation in
State v.

Kelly, supra, i.e., that an arrest aI'.d charge whic'

result in subsequent trial and acquittal are proper matters
for consideration of a trial court during sentencing.

T~

Supreme Court of l\lashington shed some light on its reasoninc
for allowing consideration during sentencing of criminal
activities which do not result in convictions.
v.

In State

Dainard, supra, the Court said:
With regard to the question whether the
court properly considered information regarding
an arrest upon which no charges were filed, we
recognize that an arrest, without charge, trial
and conviction, is not proof of guilt.
It is,
however, evidence that the arresting officer
considered that he had probable cause to make
the arrest.
The occurrence is one which has
some relevance to the question before the court
in a sentencing procedure.

537 P.2d at 762.

The Federal Courts have also allowed a trial judge
to use evidence of prior criminal conduct not resulting in

-14-
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conviction during sentencing proceedings.
v. '1organ, 595 F. 2d 1134

(Ninth Circuit 1979);

States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147
1972); United States v.

United States
Ur.ited

(Seventh Circuit

Smith, 551 F.2d 1193 (Tenth Circuit

1977); Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Pardons, 541 F.2d
938

(Second Circuit 1976); United States v. Cardi, 519

F.2d 309

(Seventh Circuit 1975); United States v. Sweig,

454 F.2d 181

(Second Cirucit 1972); United States v. Weston,

448 F. 2d 626

(Ninth Circuit 1971).

In United States v. Sweig,

supra, the sentencing court relied in part upon information
regarding crimes for which defendant was acquitted.

In upholding

this procedure used by the trial court, the United States Second
Circuit Court of Appeals said:
. just as the sentencing judge may
rely upon information as to crimes with which
the defendant has been charged but not tried,
so here the judge could properly refer
to the evidence introduced with respect to
crimes of which defendant ~as acquitted.
Acquittal does not have the effect of
conclusively establishing the untruth of all
evidence introduced against the defendant.
For all that appears in the record of the
present case, the jury may have believed all
such evidence to be true, but have found that
some essential element of the charge was not
proved.
-'54 F. 2d at 184.

Many of the Federal cases heretofore mentioned
involve Rule 32 (c) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.

That rule provides:

The report of the presentence investigatio
shall contain any prior criminal record of t~ n
defendant and such information about his
characteristics, his financial condition and
the circumstances affecting his behavior
as may be helpful in imposing sentence or in
granting probation or in the correctional
treatment of the defendant, and other such
information as may be required by the court.
(Emphasis added. )
Respondent would also point out that 18 U. S.C.A.
§

3577, enacted in 1970, which places few limitations on

the information a sentencing federal judge has access to,
has not been repealed or amended in any way by Congress. 1
It was interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Tucker,
L.Ed.2d 592

(1972).

404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct.

589, 30

The court held that as a general rule,

a federal district judge may, before sentencing, ".
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlirni ted eithe:

as to the kind of information he may consider, or the sourc·
from which it may come."

1

404 U.S. at 446.

The court did,

18 u.s.C.A. § 3577, reads:
"No limitation shall be pla
on the information concerning the background, charac~:
and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which
a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
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-however, recognize one well-defined limitation to the rule,
i.e., use or consideration of convictions obtained when
the defendant was not afforded the benefit of counsel.
The United States Supreme Court, in lhlliarns v.
People of the State of New York, 337 U.S. 241 at 247, 69

s.

Ct. 1079 at 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1760 (1949), stated the duties

of the trial judge regarding sentencing:
.A sentencing judge .
is not
confined to the narrow issue of guilt.
His
task within fixed statutory or constitutional
limits is to determine the type and extent
of punishment after the issue of guilt has
been determined.
Highly relevant--if not
essential--to his selection of an appropriate
sentence is the possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant's
life and characteristics.
The federal cases are cited to emphasize the
analogous situations that state and federal judges find
themselves in when trying to obtain all information possible
that will be helpful in fitting the punishment to the defendant
as well as the crime.

In the instant case, the central issues is whether
Judge Sam abused his discretionary powers in sentencing
appellant to zero to five years in the state penitentiary.
I~

State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978), this Court

sLated, in quoting from Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743

(Wyo.

19 7 5) :
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. a judgment in a criminal case
will not be disturbed because of sentencing
procedures unless there is a showing of an abu"
of discretion, procedural conduct pre-judicial "
to defendant, circumstances which manifest
inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct
which offends the public sense of fair play
Id. at 7 51.

The Utah Supreme Court then proceeded in its

opinion to set down the test for ascertaining whether a
trial judge abused his discretion:
Before this Court will overturn the
sentence given by the trial court, it must
be clear that the actions of the judge
were so inherently unfair as to constitute
abuse of discretion.
In State v. Harris, 10 Wash.App. 509,
518 P.2d 237 (1974), the court there said
that the exercise of discretion in sentencing
necessarily reflects the personal judgment
of the court and the appellate court can
properly find abuse only if it can be said
that no reasonable man would take the view
adopted by the trial court.
Whether or not the trial judge changed
his mind due to the conduct of the defendant
or to other reasons is not our concern.
The
sentence imposed.
. was the proper statutory
penalty for the offense .
. and this Court
will not reverse or modify a sentence prescrib~
by law unelss it is clearly excessive or unless
the trial court abused its discretion.
584 P.2d at 887, 888.
In the present case, the sentence was the proper
statutory penalty £or the offense.

Appellant was convicU

of aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann.
76-5-103

(1953), as amended.

§

Aggravated assault being a
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felony cf the third degree, Utah Code Ann.

/7-35-20

76-3-203 and

(1953), as amended, provide for a term of imprison-

"~1ot

".'Ent

§§

to exceed five years."

Of course, other sentencing

alternatives are available pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

/6-3-201

(1953), as amended.

Thus, Judge Sam was completely

within his limits in imposing the prison term.
It cannot be said that given the information
available to Judge Sam, that no reasonable man would take
the view adopted by the trial court.

The report submitted

to the court stated that "there are clear indications that
[appellant) periodically tends to lose proper intellectual
control over his behavior.

On such occasions he will display

behavior which is impulsive, ego centered, oppositional and
ci.evoid o:: proper judgment."

The appellant had already

assaulted a young lady in Provo.

He admitted to having

co;rciitted a homicide in l'iew York, though he was acquitted.
Co~Dled

with the diagnostic evaluation, it seems readily

apparent that the interests of appellant and society were
2est served by further con=inement in the penitentiary
until such time as the Board of Pardons would consider the
case.
POil\'T III
THE FO?\i?.RDING OF THE REPORT OF THE ADULT
PROB.11.TION AND PJ..ROLE DEPJ..RTF.ENT TO THE
PAROLE BOARD DID NOT UNJUSTLY LENGTHEN
?.PPELLAI\"T' S TERI'i OF IMPRISONMENT.
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r

Appellant alleges that the forwarding of the
report about him prepared by the Adult Probation and
Parole Department to the Board of Pardons has operated to
lengthen his stay in prison.

2

The Board of Pardons had no,

met on appellant's case, thus any reasons for denial of
probation at this point in time are purely speculative a~
not subject to appeal.

Respondent submits that since the

trial court has such wide latitude

in concidering all

matters bearing upon the personal history and behavior of
the appellant, including matters for which he had been trie:
and acquitted, the Board of Pardons, which is concerned ritl

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-62-8 (c) (1953), as amended, compel:
the trial court to forward information he has regardin~
various aspects of appellant's sentence:
In cases where an indeterminate
sentence is imposed, the judge imposing the
sentence and the state's attorney prosecuting
the case must each, within 30 days from the
date of such sentence, mail to the executive
secretary of the board of pardons a statement
in writing setting out the terms for which,
in their respective opinions, the prisoner
so sentencec ought to be imprisoned, together
with any information they may have regarding
the character of the prisoner or anv mitigating
or aggravating circum~tances connected with the
offense for which the prisoner has been
convicted, and any other information that
will aid the board of pardons in passing upon
the application for the termination or commutation of such sentence, or for parole or pardon.
Such statements shall be presented to the board
of pardons at the next regular meeting of the
board, and shall be preserved in the files of
the board.
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st1

all facets of a prisoner's character, nake-up and behavior,
is, a fortiori,
co~tents

entitled to be fully advised of the

of the presentence report.

States Boe.rd of Parole,

541

~-

Billiteri v. United

2d 938

(Second Circuit 1976).

Thus appellant can claim no error on behalf of the Board
of Pardons in not having granted the appellant
since they

his parole,

(the Board of Pardons) are considering the

sru.ie information as the trial judge considered.
The allegations of appellant regarding the Board
of Pardons are strictly conjectural and have no foundation
or basis for appeal and should thusly

not be considered.

CONCLUSIO'.~

The appellant has not stated a claim on which
this Court can find as a matter of law that the trial court
c.bused its discretion in considering t..he confession by appellant
:n -che presentence report.

Nor has appellant shown that the

-cric.l ~udge abused his discretion in sentencing appellant to the
penitentiary for the term provided by law.

The claim that the

::o,-.,,-c.rC:ing cf t'.-:e report of the ;;dult Probation and Parole
:;ep=.rtr.er_ t to -che Pc.role Board lenghtened appellant's sentence
:s unfounded and ~as nc basis in -chis appeal.

Respondent
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therefore respectfully requests this Court to affirm the
sentence of the lower court.
Respectfully submitted
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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